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One may safely say of the Attorney General's National Commit-
tee To Study the Antitrust Laws, as of similar bodies, that whether
or not it added to the common weal, it enriched the education of its
members. So far as concerns the writer's ideas on the economic nature
of price discrimination, he must indeed confess either an enviable con-
sistency or a regrettable inability to learn.' But as a problem in com-
munication between lawyers and economists, where the gaps in under-
standing still yawn wide; in the relationship of the specialist with the
policy maker on one side and with his conscience on the other; and in
the resolution of conflict and the imperfect nature of the tool of lan-
guage-the proceedings of the Committee, in plenary session, in work
groups, and in those darker corners where the members were sent whom
the Co-Chairmen "ad hoc'd," were richly rewarding.
However, the purpose of this article is not autobiographical. Nor
is it in any sense an authoritative exposition of a document which, if
it is worth anything, must speak for itself. It may be that in the
future, litigants will search for the "intent" of the Committee's drafts-
men as today they search for legislative "intent" or as the Roman
soothsayers sought knowledge by poking around in the entrails of a
goose. One can only take refuge in the common sense observation
that probably no two members of the Committee had precisely the same
thing in mind when they approved, or disapproved, any given part of
its Report.2 This article assumes a knowledge of those parts of the
Report which deal with price discrimination 8 and attempts to explain
one member's views in somewhat greater detail.
t Associate Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Member, Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws.
B.S.S., College of the City of New York, 1938; Ph.D. (Econ.), Harvard, 1948.
1. Most of the ideas stated in this article, sometimes in rather summary fashion,
have been developed in more detail in earlier writings. See Adelman, The Consistency
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1953); Adelman, Integration and
Anti-trust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1949); Adelman, Effective Competition and
the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1948); DUNN & VAN CIsE, HOw TO
COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 290, 294 (1954). Detailed references to them
will not be made.
2. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).
3. REPORT at 155-221.
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PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A great and much-abused economist once said of his chief work:
"The ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are ex-
tremely simple and should be obvious. The difficulty lies, not in
the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify,
for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner
of our minds." 
If the reader, while following the economic exposition, is willing to put
out of his mind, for the time being, any possible legal implications, he
will find no difficulties in it. Such a purely economic analysis is needed
because the Report does not undertake it. There is, to be sure, a chap-
ter on Economic Indicia ' which, I should like to think, will be helpful
to legislature, bench and bar, but this does not pretend to be more than
a selection of certain ideas which may be of use in evaluating given
cases. The reader may well be puzzled by the fact that price dis-
crimination is discussed so differently under Economic Indicia and
under Distribution,' and wonder whether at both places the Report
is talking about the same thing. I think it is, but it seems worth the
effort to try building a bridge between them.
I.
Price discrimination, in the economic sense, exists when price
differentials do not correspond altogether with cost differentials. Dis-
crimination may exist without any price differences when two, or
more, buyers are charged the same price but it costs less to serve one
than another. A buyer paying a lower price is discriminated against
if the lower price does not fully reflect a lower cost of serving him. The
"lower costs" may arise from the omission of certain manufacturing
processes, or distributive services, or many other reasons; and, since
price less cost equals profit, it follows that price discrimination, in the
economic sense, is rigorously defined as a difference in the profit earned
from one customer as against another.a
This condition is of course very widespread in the business world.
Most of these profit differentials, which we will henceforth call dis-
criminations, are transitory and fortuitous. If there were established
a condition of perfect non-discrimination this morning, by nightfall
there wotild be plenty of discrimination; if for no other reason than
unforeseen changes in supply and demand.' Those changes make some
4. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY Viii
(1936).
5. REPORT at 315-42.
6. Id. at 129, 155-221.
- 6a. "More precisely, it is the profit rate on the current value of the necessary
investment, converted to a per-unit basis.
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customers, some products, some localities, some channels of supply,
more remunerative than others, and an alert business management will
always be on the lookout for these more profitable opportunities and
exploit them as best it can.
But this process must under active competition destroy the dis-
criminations which initiated the process. As business concerns devote
their labor and capital to these more profitable sales, and pro tanto
withdraw from less profitable ones, they increase supply in the one
market and decrease it in the other. So long as there is any profit dif-
ferential-any discrimination-there remains an incentive to continue
the process until the discrimination has been completely removed; but
in the meantime, other changes in market conditions have created new
differentials. Thus, under competition, discriminations are always
being created and always being destroyed. To block either the creative
or the destructive part of the process is to block competition.
Under competition, there cannot be any stable and permanent price
discrimination on any given product. Price differentials net of cost
differentials, i.e., variations in profit per unit as between two or more
buyers, cannot be maintained permanently. For under competition,
sellers will try to switch from the low-margin to the high-margin
buyers until all the margins are equalized and there is no more dis-
crimination. The only genuine exceptions to this rule arise from
differences in efficiency and from the ignorance or inertia of buyers
or sellers about better alternatives. All other "exceptions" are spurious,
and upon examination, turn out to involve cost differentials which
merely cannot be precisely measured.
It cannot be emphasized too much that cost differentials in eco-
nomic language do not mean "cost justification" under the Robinson-
Patman Act.7  That is an altogether different subject-a statutory
standard of proof, not an economic category. We are concerned with
cost-price differentials which exist as business facts and which at least
a minority of buyers or sellers know to exist," whether or not they
have a precise idea of just how much they amount to. Profit-and-loss
statements are "mere estimates," with wide margins of error, and
yet they are used as guides to business policy. The reader should be
disabused once and for all of the notion that cost differences in the
economic sense refer to cost accounting records-still less to that tiny
minority of cost accounting records which would pass FTC scrutiny.
Capitalist enterprise and profit incentives existed long before cost
7. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
8. The reason why only a minority need know of the cost difference is explained
below.
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accounting records; and relatively few business decisions are based
merely on cost accounting records, useful as these may be. Our ex-
perience with price control taught us that much.
If, therefore, stable discrimination on any given product is im-
possible under active competition, its presence indicates some block
somewhere to the competitive process. For example, a monopolist
will increase his profits if he is able to divide his customers and get
from each of them the highest price each is willing to pay. The cur-
rent price of refined copper is around 50 cents per pound; but there
are customers who if need be could be made to pay ten or a hundred
times that much. A monopolist of copper would try to sell to them
at the high price if he could prevent those who bought at the lower
price from re-selling. What is perhaps not so readily apparent is why
our fictitious copper monopolist accepts the lower price from these other
customers. The reason is that if he tried to divert copper from the
lower-to the higher-paying customers, some of it would remain unsold,
because these customers will take no more at the higher price. So we
arrive at a general rule: a seller who accepts lower net prices (lower
profit per unit) from some buyers than from others does so because
he is better off selling some output at the lower margin than if he
tried to push it into the higher-margin market; for he could not sell
it in the higher-margin market except by lowering the price so far as
to reduce his total profits.
Of rather different but perhaps greater significance is stable dis-
crimination practiced by a group of sellers. It can only exist if they
have some agreement or understanding to get higher margins from
some buyers than from others. The essence of such an understanding
is that nobody will undercut the agreed-on price schedule and offer
better terms to the higher-margin buyer. If some of the sellers do
this, they will begin to attract away this higher-margin trade, and
others will jump on the band wagon. Starting perhaps with offers
to pass on a fraction of the higher margin, the competitive process would
in time erode away all of it. Hence its persistence over time cannot be
explained except as resulting from some kind of understanding to in-
hibit competition. (This is, of course, no necessary proof of illegal
behavior.)
The tie between discrimination and monopoly power is often hard
for lawyers steeped in Robinson-Patman to accept because discrimina-
tion seems to them to be found mostly among small, powerless con-
cerns. This impression is in large part derived from price "discrimi-
9. See p. 232 infra.
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nation" in the Robinson-Patman sense, not in the economic sense. A
firm with a one-price policy may be really discriminating by getting
more from some customers than from others. Conversely, the "dis-
criminating" firm may be a non-discriminator, doing no more than
bid for the wider-margin business by offering some or all of the margin
to gain additional trade-to the disgust of its fellows.
This deserves a moment of attention. Let the reader consider the
very small firm with an infinitesimal share of its market, for example,
the grain farmer. On anybody's definition, such a firm has no power
or "bargaining power" whatsoever. Yet nobody ever heard of it dis-
criminating in price. A reasonable farmer has no need to shade the
price to anyone, since he can sell all he desires to sell at the current
price. Nor can he hope to get more than this price from anyone, since
a customer has plenty of other suppliers from whom to buy. He cannot,
therefore, discriminate in price; any differential he grants is and must
be merely an allowance for lower quality, or freight or other service
performed.
As we get farther away from these markets, the possibility of dis-
crimination, by small sellers with little market power, does arise-
for a rather special, but often important, reason. A small seller, let
us suppose, is practicing genuine price discrimination-taking larger
net returns from some customers than from others. Obviously, he
must be better off doing it than trying to sell everything at the higher
price. Now a monopolist, as already seen, knows that he has sold all
that the higher-margin market will absorb at the existing price and
that he is better off dumping the excess at the lower price than bringing
down the price in the other markets. If the small seller does not at-
tempt to sell everything at the higher price, it follows that there is some
inhibition on his freedom of action. If he passes up the apparent chance
to take a higher profit, it is because he is convinced that the sellers as
a group are better off trying to get the higher price on smaller sales
and disposing of the excess to some more favored customers.
When a seller thinks and acts in terms of industry welfare as a
whole, he is of course thinking and acting precisely as would a mo-
nopolist, who is the industry as a whole. Hence the small seller who
follows a consistent and stable pattern of price discrimination in the
economic sense, not Robinson-Patman "discrimination,"' is adhering
to an industry-wide understanding-which need not be an agreement
or conspiracy in the legal sense. It may be a time honored custom;
followed by all because it increases profit; or it may result from in-
formal pressure by others.
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So far it looks as though discrimination, except when unintended
or "passive" discrimination,' is always evidence of monopoly behavior.
However, this is not so. For, when a non-competitive price is being
maintained at a higher level, and a seller wants more volume, the temp-
tation is great to reduce the price to some buyers for the sake of the
additional sales volume and larger total profits. Under these cir-
cumstances, discriminatory selling may be evidence not of a functioning
monopoly but of an ineffective or disintegrating one.
This leads us to a paradox which is of great practical importance.
Let us imagine a group of sellers who charge discriminatory prices
to several classes of buyers. One seller wants to shade prices for more
volume, and he therefore offers a better deal to some buyers. It is
quite likely that his offer is simply the recognition of lower costs of
serving those buyers, i.e., the recognition of higher margins per unit.
Now his price cut may be discriminatory in either or both of two
senses: he is not lowering his prices to all buyers; and the new lower
prices may not be offered to all of the lower-cost (wider-margin)
buyers. But his new price structure is yet less discriminatory than the
old price structure, in that some of the discrimination has been eroded
away through the constant tendency to seek out the wider-margin
business. A discriminatory method leads to a less discriminatory result.
Thus general or theoretical reasoning would lead us to expect just
the sort of complex situations we meet in real life, where discrimination
and non-discrimination are mingled; where some discriminations may
indicate control of the market and others, the breakdown of control;
where a given price change may in part be discriminatory and in part
non-discriminatory. It is perhaps disorderly, but that is the kind of
economic system we have, and that is why we need an analytic ap-
paratus to understand it.
II.
Thus far, we have dealt with price discrimination only as an indi-
cator of price competition failing to operate--or, sometimes, operating
after a lag in time. This is perhaps its most important aspect, to flag
situations which require explanation. When business concerns accept
permanently lower returns from some customers than from others, it
is a case of water flowing up hill. The situation may be trivial, or
actually desirable, or it may indicate an overdue corrective action, or
it may indicate control of the market; and even when it signals control,
that may be no violation of law. But signal something it does.
10. For this useful term, I am indebted to my student Benjamin L. Stevens.
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Why, however, should there be any objection to discrimination as
such? To the extent that economics has developed a science of wel-
fare, there is no disagreement that passive discrimination resulting
from nothing more than pursuit of opportunities as they arise is posi-
tively beneficial; and that corrective discrimination, which serves to
break down a non-competitive price system, which may itself be dis-
criminatory, is at least useful. Why should there be any objection to
stable and permanent discrimination, however? So far as concerns
discrimination among ultimate consumers, the answer is by no means
clear. Discrimination makes the distribution of real income different
from what it would be under competition; but it is difficult to prove
that this latter distribution is "optimal" in any rigorous sense. Per-
haps we need nothing so refined, but merely a sense of injustice that
some people are getting more than others despite their rendering no
additional service, either of their own efforts or their own property,
that anyone can see. In any case, the problem is of no legal impor-
tance.
Discrimination among business concerns, however, is more clearly
objectionable, if and only if, competition is needed as the great selective
agent of our economy. If we desire the competitive process to insure
that only the most efficient processes and producers survive, then dis-
crimination serves to distort the system of rewards and punishments
of a profit-and-loss system: it means that the survivors will not neces-
sarily be the most efficient. Before going into the matter a little more
deeply, it is worth remarking that for those to whom competition means
some more lofty goal than efficiency-say the social and political bene-
fits, so well exemplified in contemporary France, of keeping as many
small businessmen in existence as possible-there is no such basic ob-
jection to discrimination. In fact, those to whom "competition"
means "many happy little competitors" must support discrimination
in favor of their proteges and against others, and in fact they do. Wit-
ness the Robinson-Patman Act as currently interpreted.
Resuming the economic objections to discrimination: it may pre-
vent the race from going to the swift, either among the sellers who dis-
criminate, or among their customers. We consider each in turn.
Sellers
Among the sellers themselves, the objectionable situation is pred-
atory or destructive discrimination. The essential need is for the
attacking firm to have an outside source of income or a war chest, and
for the attacked firm to have no or few other means of sales and profits
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except in the area where discriminatory price cuts are made. Hence
the attacking firm, by making deep price cuts in one locality, or on one
product line, can trade losses dollar for dollar with the small one until
the latter is either put out of business or agrees to follow a policy con-
genial to the larger firm.
Another essential condition is that entry into the market be diffi-
cult. If it is easy, then any attempt of the successful attacker to reap
his ill-gotten gains by raising prices or deteriorating service would
mean simply a loss of trade.
A milder form of this conduct, not predatory but still preclusive
and uneconomic, was well exemplified in the Shoe Machinery case."
The district court stated with emphasis that United did not try to kill
off competition when it set its leases to yield widely varying rates of
return on the applicable investment. But ". . . in the face of com-
petition, and with the purpose of meeting or defeating that competition,
and retaining or expanding its own share of the market . . .," United
lowered prices or improved quality to ". . . reach only that area of
the shoe machinery industry which [was] being assailed by a competi-
tor. . ." 2 Thus their discrimination was both an important in-
dicator of their monopoly and an important aid to maintaining it; both
cause and effect. A highly sophisticated district court recognized that
price discrimination might be justifiable or actually desirable in certain
situations, but that the case at bar fitted none of them.
This portion of the opinion has been called "one of the most dis-
turbing rulings in recent years." ' It does not seem an over-subtle
distinction to say that this part of the opinion was not a ruling but a
finding of fact, and, in my own view, a correct one. United's price
discrimination was not held an independent ground for liability, but
rather an important piece of evidence to show United's monopoly
power, in the economic sense. This power, plus something more, con-
stituted "monopolization" in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Consistent with our interpretation of this part of the opinion
as finding rather than ruling is the district court's explicit refusal to
consider putting non-discrimination into its remedial decree.
What may be "disturbing" about the ruling is simply its possible
misunderstanding and misuse. It is an easy if illicit step to say that
any company, preferably large, is probably monopolizing by taking
different rates of profit on different lines of business; and the argu-
11. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 326-29,
340 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
12. Id. at 329.
13. VAN CIS, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRusT LAWS 104-05 (1955).
1955]
230 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
ment has been made that there is a tendency for a large, diversified
firm to take on business at prices which do not cover full costs, thereby
thwarting competitors who might really be more efficient. This sup-
posed tendency does not exist. Of course a diversified firm may be
"passively" discriminating by doing the best it can in several markets
of unequal competitive intensity but in none of which it has any sub-
stantial monopoly power. However, the large diversified firm is no
more or less willing than any other firm to take permanently thin or
zero margins over cost. Like any other firm, it may do so in the hope
that demand will revive and prices improve; or it may be stuck with
an operation out of which it will try to take as much of the investment
as it can, and then get out. There is no rhyme or reason in such
behavior as a permanent matter, except by a monopolist who is able
but unwilling to switch from the lower- to the higher-profit market
because he would flood the latter, bring down the price and reduce
his total profit. This requires corroborating evidence, which was of
course present in Shoe Machinery, but cannot be assumed into existence.
The economic analysis of injury to competition among sellers
by price discrimination really reduces to the traditional legal query:
would a reasonable and prudent business manager find it in his interest
to perform these allegedly predatory or preclusive acts? Unless the
evidence permits us to answer Yes, the inquiry should stop right there.
Buyers
We turn now to injury to competition among buyers through price
discrimination, and on the whole this is in economics a simpler matter.
The buyer whose purchases yield the seller the lower margin of profit
(although this does not mean necessarily that he is receiving the
"lower price" in the world of Robinson-Patman) has an advantage over
other buyers not due to his, superior efficiency. The selective force
of competition, which would preserve the more and weed out the less
efficient is lost or distorted. There may of course be some offsetting
gain. A buyer may precipitate a general price reduction, undermining
the sellers' stable understanding on prices, by offering additional busi-
ness at less than the prevailing price to several sellers, who yield to
temptation severally and lose their mutual confidence."' When, as
explained earlier, a discriminatory reduction serves to change the
13a. The willingness of sellers to accept additional business at a low margin
of profit is discussed at p. 227 supra. See also Adelman, Effective Comnpetition
and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. Rzv. 1289, 1330-32 (1948).
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whole price structure in the direction of non-discrimination, this seems
like an obvious help to the competitive process. 3b Even when the dis-
criminatory reduction does not have an ultimate non-discriminatory
effect, the policing power of such buyers to prevent and break up
non-competitive pricing is certainly a policing force toward more com-
petition. Of course, there is such a thing as overpaying the policeman,
but little can be said about it in general. Appraisals must be in terms
of striking a balance of effects in particular markets.
III.
The Committee's use of a Sherman Act case 14 rather than a Robin-
son-Patman case to illustrate price discrimination in the economic sense
was not accidental. Whereas, on the whole, Sherman Act cases 15 in-
volving this phenomenon have adhered fairly closely to economic con-
cepts, such is not the situation when we enter the altogether different
world of Robinson-Patman. The A & P case " was, in H. Thomas
Austern's phrase, "a Robinson-Patman wolf in Sherman Act clothing,"
and illustrates the confusion of economic concepts surrounding Robin-
son-Patman. The act is generally considered to be directed against
price "discrimination" by sellers coerced or influenced by the "power"
or "bargaining power" or "coercive power," or something, of large
buyers. Now if "power" means monopoly power or market control
in the economic sense, it must be said at once that there is no logical
foundation for this. There is simply no way discovered by economic
analysis to make the connection between monopoly power on the buy-
ing side to price discrimination on the selling side. A monopoly buyer,
or monopsonist, might indeed pay a single very low price; or he might
discriminate in the prices he paid, making separate bargains with his
suppliers, and paying some of them more than others. But he c~uld
not get sellers to discriminate in price unless the sellers themselves had
some monopoly power. As we noted earlier, a seller with zero mo-
nopoly power (pure competition) would never have the motive or
13b. Id. at 1331-32 & n.167.
14. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
15. The lawyer is fortunate indeed to have three such outstanding opinions as
Shoe Machifery; United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y.
1934), aff'd, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); and United States v. Corn Products Refining Co.,
234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). It is a fair generalization that the courts analyzed
discrimination, found it to be symptomatic of control of the particular market, and
decided accordingly.
16. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949).
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the power to discriminate in price. A seller who was only a small
part of the market would not charge a lower price to the big buyer;
he would sell all he could to the better-paying buyers. If all sellers
did this, the final result would be to equalize the price paid by the large
semi-monopolist buyer with the prices paid by others. This less than
competitive price might of course be as objectionable as a higher than
competitive price, but it would not be discriminatory.
Buying power or "bargaining power" of buyers leading to price
discrimination by sellers is therefore like the Emperor's new clothes;
one's professional duty is to say that there is no such thing. The
residuum of sense in the idea is that sellers with some appreciable
market control are able to charge higher prices to smaller buyers who
cannot shop around than to large buyers who can. In other words,
the monopoly power of certain sellers is limited by buyers who lack
any monopoly buying power but who do -enjoy an economy of larger
size-the ability to maintain a buying organization.
There is a widespread impression that the Chain Store Investiga-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission disclosed much price discrimina-
tion in favor of large buyers by small suppliers with little bargaining
power. The Investigation established no such thing. It estimated
that roughly 85 per cent of the differences in selling price between
chain and non-chain stores was accounted for by lower operating costs.'
7
Even this was a gross underestimate because the Commission made
little or no allowance for cost differentials. The FTC made no attempt
to find out whether and to what extent quantity discounts corres-
ponded to cost savings; they considered as "preferential" the granting
of the wholesaler's discount to a chain store, even though the latter's
warehouse was physically and economically indistinguishable from a
wholesaler's warehouse, and sales to it netted the seller no less and
probably more. Again, the equivalent of brokerage allowed the buyer
was counted as "preferential," even though there was no reason given
for supposing that the seller netted any less in allowing the brokerage
equivalent to a buyer than to a broker.
As a matter of fact, the economist in charge of the Investigation
wrote elsewhere that quantity and related discounts usually failed to
make full allowance for cost savings-which means that even before
Robinson-Patman there was some discrimination, in the economic sense,
against the "preferred" buyers.'" Another FTC study showed that ip
17. FTC, FINAL REPORT ON TH- CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION 55 (1934).
18. Stevens, An Interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 2 J. MARKET. 44
(1937).
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1936, the net return to the sellers of fresh fruit and vegetables was
greatest on sales to the chain stores. 9
It is perfectly clear that the FTC was investigating not price dis-
crimination, in the economic sense, but price differentials. To be sure,
there was occasional recognition that differentials might do no mote
than reflect differences in cost, but this was never carried into practice.
What is true of the FTC report is even more obvious in the
congressional hearings on the Robinson-Patman Act ° (As for the
floor debates, the less said the better.) Now, the fact that Congress
plainly was not directing its legislation against price discrimination in
the economic sense does not necessarily mean that it was legislating
badly. There may have been the best of reasons why Congress should
legislate against price differentials rather than price discrimination.
But there is no evidence whatever that Congress was ever made aware
of the distinction, or realized -the consequences, to be explored later,21
of their act. There is no way of telling whether they thought they
were legislating against price discrimination, or whether they were
trying to prescribe discrimination against lower-cost buyers by pre-
scribing price uniformity. Doubtless some knew what they were
doing; obviously most did not.
This is rather curious. No brief or opinion in a Robinson-Patman
case is complete without great argument about the act and about the
legislative intent behind it. Any self-respecting law firm has reams of
memoranda on the subject. Yet if ever there were a perfect example
of the legislature not knowing the consequences of its actions, and not
knowing what it intended, this was it.
"[W]hen a Legislature has had a real intention, one way or
another, on a point, it is not one in a hundred times that any
doubt arises as to what its intention was. . . . The fact is that
the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legis-
lature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is
raised on the statute never occurred to it. ."2
IV.
In order to understand the meaning of the act against price dif-
ferentials, not against discrimination in the economic sense, let us
19. FTC, 1 REPORT ON DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND COSTS 140-41 (1944).
20. Hearings Before the Special Committee of the House on Investigation of
the American Retail Federation, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936) ; Hearings Before the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1936).
21. See pp. 234-36, 241 infra.
22. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 172-73 (1909).
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imagine a group of sellers who discriminate in that they make more
money from certain customers whom they charge the same price but
whom it costs less to serve. This is what the act requires. Under
competition, as we saw earlier, there would be a strong tendency for
the sellers to bid this higher-margin business away from each other,
forcing down the margin toward equality with the other customers.
This tendency would not require that any sellers know their expenses
with cost-accounting precision. It would require only that some sellers
know, approximately, that certain classes of sales were more remunera-
tive than others. Once the minority knew this, and acted as it would
be in their interest to do, the rest would be forced to follow.' (If
the minority turned out to be wrong, the rest would not be forced
to follow.) That is how the competitive process operates. Now,
if the sellers wanted to temper the competitive wind to the shorn wolf,
they would enter into an agreement not to reflect the lower costs in
lower prices. Then each of them could quote uniform prices despite
non-uniform costs, could thereby discriminate against lower-cost cus-
tomers, and earn higher profits than would be possible under competi-
tion-secure in the knowledge that he was not being underbid.
An agreement to supply this security would of course be illegal
and would collapse if even a few parties stopped observance. But
the Robinson-Patman Act enforces this result with the sanctions of
law.
The clearest-cut example is of course the brokerage clause, sec-
tion 2 (c).14 A seller who disposes of his goods through brokers and
also through direct buyers is not allowed to recognize any cost savings
on selling to direct buyers. He may not accept the same net return
from both parties. He must charge the direct buyer a phantom broker-
age, and put the extra money into his pocket. This means a dis-
crimination against direct buyers, including cooperative buying groups,
and a legally privileged status for brokers. An equivalent of the broker-
age clause was part of the notorious Sugar Institute code which the
courts struck down in the mid 1930's;2 another equivalent is con-
tained in the agreements between advertising agencies and publishers,
against which the Department of Justice has recently filed suit."
23. There might be a period of jockeying for position, with price finally con-
verging to a new lower level.
24. 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1952).
25. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), aff'd,
297 U.S. 553 (1936).
26. United States v. American Ass'n of Advertising Agencies, CCH Trade Reg.
Rep. (10th ed.) 1166175.
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But section 2 (a),2' providing for "cost justification," is in practice
not very different from section 2 (c). We mentioned earlier that under
section 2(c), no costs saved by dealing with the direct buyer will be
recognized by the law to "justify" a price differential. But as a prac-
tical matter, very few costs saved by dealing with any buyer can ever
be recognized and allowed under the act. The expense of assembling
cost information is very heavy and ofter prohibitive. Secondly, there
are many costs, particularly distribution costs, on which precise in-
formation cannot be had because there are common and joint cost
elements. Many cost savings which exist and therefore determine
business conduct cannot be estimated precisely or documented even
though reasonable men would agree that they do exist, and that their
magnitude at least falls within certain limits. The Report emphasizes
this fact.2" However, it has even greater substantive significance
than is apparent there. The burden of proof is on the would-be price
cutter. Unless he can demonstrate the precise amount of the lower
costs, the law will not even recognize their existence. Thus a pro-
cedural requirement results in discrimination against lower-cost buyers
and higher profit margins taken from them than could exist under
competition. Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission has set stand-
ards impossible to meet, although matters may be changing in this
respect.
Most important of all, every seller knows that every other seller
is in the same boat and will find it difficult or impossible to "justify"
a lower price. Each seller knows that every rival, if he is to reflect
lower costs in lower prices, must run a gauntlet with almost no chance
of survival. Hence there is little danger that any other seller will try
to bid away this higher-margin business by the offer of a price cut.
The effect of everybody's knowing everybody else's intentions not to
cut price is precisely the same as if there were a collusive agreement
not to cut the price. The knowledge by each seller that his rivals will
not depart from price uniformity for fear of the FTC or the treble-
damage suit is far better reassurance than a few telephone calls or a
conference in the cocktail lounge.
Given all these facts, the businessman who knows that he saves
money by dealing with certain customers will try to get the extra profits
from them if he can. If he decides to get more of that business than
he has, he will not waste his time and money trying to "justify" a
lower price; he will simply try by legal or extra-legal means to get it.
For example, some sellers may decide that they are better off specializ-
27. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
28. REPoRT at 172-74.
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ing and selling only to the more profitable types of buyers. In that
case, they can sell at one price, stay within the law, and yet obtain
the wider-margin business.
Whatever the reason, if at least one or a few sellers are able to
pass on the savings to their lower-cost customers, and get business
away from their rivals, it then becomes possible, under section 2(b) 9
of the Robinson-Patman Act, for all competing sellers to do so, since
they are merely meeting the equally low price of a competitor. Indeed,
the competitors may not have much choice in the matter; they may be
forced-"coerced"-to meet the price or lose the business.
Hence the real importance of section 2(b) is this: it permits cost
savings to be passed on, not directly by being "justified" under 2(a),
but indirectly, through the need to meet the competition of the first
sellers offering the lower prices. This process usually represents the
breakdown of a discriminatory structure of uniform prices and non-
uniform profit margins. So long as the act prescribes this kind of
structure, the force of competition will push against it, and section
2(b) must be, in the economic nature of the case, a means of escape
from the difficulties of cost justification. Hence the meeting-competi-
tion issue is important and intractable.
This is why the distinction between discrimination in the economic
sense and "discrimination" in the Robinson-Patman sense is not a
quarrel over words. It involves the whole competitive process, and
the whole meaning of the act. To put the burden of proof on the re-
spondent and accept only cost savings provable with some exactness,
and to narrow the meeting competition defense, is to make a choice in
favor of the present cartel-like results. The effectiveness of the carteli-
zation must not be exaggerated. It is a general rule that diversity of
cost structures makes it difficult to arrive at a stable understanding
or agreement among competitors, because a price which would best
suit the interests of one group will not suit another. The great di-
versity of marketing structure, which the Attorney-General's Com-
mittee emphasizes,"0 has disruptive effects upon the act, as it must on
any cartel-like arrangement, and the disruption leads to outcries for
more stringent enforcement.
Whether it is "right" or "wrong" to ignore cost differences, en-
force uniform prices and discriminate against lower-cost buyers, is
something for every man to answer according to his own predilections;
the consequences happen whether we like them or not.
29. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
30. R P RT at 204.
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The Report proposes a liberalization of both sections 2(a) and
2(b), but it does not state with any precision just how far this would
go. Hence its suggestion is only an alleviation, not a remedy, and
leaves a permanent and vexing problem which would disappear or at
least wear a very different aspect if "discrimination" in the law were
considered as simply discrimination in the economic sense. However,
what is possibly more important than any formal action is that the
Report will contribute to the gradual realization, by the bar and the
tribunals, of how strange a standard it is which simply assumes that
price differentials are discriminatory. A striking example is in the
recent dismissal of the Automatic Canteen complaint."' The Federal
Trade Commission noted that Automatic Canteen paid lower prices,
but it also noted (twelve years after the proceedings were initiated!)
that:
"Respondent's price was an f.o.b. while the standard price
to its competitors was a delivered price.
"Respondent obtained its confection items in plain cartons
.while suppliers shipped the same items to competitors in litho-
graphed cartons.
"Respondent obtained a straight price which would reflect
the elimination of free deals and the right to make returns of
stale and unsaleable merchandise. The price to competitors did
not reflect the elimination of these factors.
"It also appears that in dealing with respondents, suppliers
achieved some savings in selling expense.
[There is a] possibility that the prices accorded re-
spondent were not cost justified. But . . . no attempt was
made to circumscribe the area in which cost savings would be
operative. . . . [T]he prosecution has not established a prima
facie case in this record." 82
Of course, this opinion was in a section 2(f) s case and decided
only that, in view of these facts on cost, a respondent buyer had no
reason to know that his prices were not cost justified. This opinion
has no direct significance for section 2(a). What is striking is that,
for over twelve years, these obvious sources of cost differentials were
officially ignored, but are slowly forcing themselves into the official
consciousness.
Perhaps it is now clear, if it was obscure, why the Report is able
to take, without contradiction, the positions that: (1) stable and per-
31. Automatic Canteen Co. of America, Dkt. 4933 (mimeo. Jan. 12, 1955)
(order dismissing count 2 of complaint).
32. Id. at p. 3.
33. 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1952).
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manent price discrimination in the economic sense is an indicium of
market control, and (2) that price "discriminations," under the Robin-
son-Patman Act, should be permitted under section 2(b) without any
limitations as to duration or extent. The idea that this wider in-
terpretation of section 2(b) permits "discrimination" and, hence, the
exercise of monopoly power is simply a play on words. Patterns of
price "discrimination" in the Robinson-Patman sense tell us nothing
about whether or not there is any price discrimination in the economic
sense nor hence any reason to suspect market control.
This statement is meant literally and deserves emphasis by way
of analogy. Suppose that we wished to inquire whether a corporation
was profitable. We would need to know whether the receipts exceeded
the outlay, and by how much. The fact that the company had receipts
of thus many millions of dollars would be evidence, but not only would
it not be conclusive evidence of profitability, standing by itself, it would
not even be prima facie evidence. It would support no conclusion,
not even the most tentative. Similarly, and for reasons so well illus-
trated by the quotation from Automatic Canteen, the existence of the
most stable and permanent price differentials or Robinson-Patman
"discriminations" would not even be prima facie evidence of discrim-
ination in the economic sense, or evidence of a block to competition
or the exercise of monopoly power.
V.
On the optimistic or, if one likes, pessimistic assumption that the
recommendations of the Committee will be largely carried out, it seems
worth while to look briefly at the type of price discrimination case
which will assume greater importance. It is a type which has emerged
most clearly perhaps in the so-called "area price discrimination" cases,
but this is largely fortuitous. Substitute "product" or "distribution
channel" for "area," and the problems of economic analysis and public
policy are the same.
The Reports4 refers briefly to the General Foods decision.U
Nearly all members approved it as a "sound and accurate reading" 36
of the law, on the point that a mere difference in price was not pre-
sumptively illegal and that in all cases "the substantiality of the effects
reasonably probable" 37 had to be established. Apart from this point,
the agreement would have been much less wide, and indeed there is no
34. REoR at 162-63.
35. General Foods Co., Dkt. 5675 (mimeo. April 27, 1954).
36. REPoRT at 163.
37. Ibid.
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way of knowing which way the majority of the Committee would have
inclined, had there been any need to comment further on General
Foods. The writer, who concurs in the Report on this point, con-
siders the decision as otherwise a regrettable one, and believes he would
not lack company from his colleagues. The reasons are of a fairly
general order.
The acts of General Foods were discriminatory in the economic
sense; there was no way of accounting for the price differences by cost
differences-quite apart from any possibility of cost "justification."
Furthermore, this discriminatory pricing was not an incident of com-
petition, where the company granting the differential was one of a
number of producers, engaged in a brisk oligopoly struggle for busi-
ness. Here, on the contrary, General Foods was close to being a
national monopolist. The origin of the near-monopoly was a lawful
one (a patent), but its maintenance by means of price discrimination,
after the expiration of the patent, might raise questions under sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act3 This aspect is sharpened by certain
correspondence which suggests, although it does not prove, specific
intent to eliminate a competitor.3 9 Even if this document be dis-
regarded or its implications rebutted, the least that can be said is that
General Foods was confronted with a localized threat to its dominant
market position and was able to cut prices in only one part of the
country while maintaining prices everywhere else. This was not an
instance of "passive discrimination," or of a seller under strong though
imperfect and unequal competitive pressures. It was entirely unlike
the situation in the A & P case, where the defendant sold at varying
profit margins in many markets, in none of which it had monopoly
power.40
What should be, and what is, the applicable law to such situations?
Part of the answer must be candidly to admit that under the present
law, the problem is insoluble as a general problem. Escape must be
found in every instance through the facts of the particular case, so that
one can say that antitrust objectives are better served by finding for
one party rather than the other. But in every instance we are faced
by the dilemma: to forbid discriminatory pricing is to freeze the pres-
38. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342-43
(D. Mass. 1953).
39. General Foods Co., Dkt. 5675, at 8 (mimeo. April 27, 1954) (dissenting
opinion, quoting Commission exhibit 28).
40. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949) ; cf. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
Civil No. 52-139, S.D.N.Y., Jan. 18, 1954 (final judgment), where the mere existence
of differential profit margins is agreed not to constitute liability. Nothing more was
ever proved in the criminal action.
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ent price pattern, to put an obstacle in the way of adjustment of prices
to changes in supply and demand, and to give the local producer a kind
of tariff protection. The realization of this fact lies not too far below
everyone's consciousness. As a very amateur student of advocacy,
the writer could not help but be struck by the way the Brief for Re-
spondent, in its very first sentence, hit the keynote that the western
competitor of General Foods was in search of a regional monopoly and
that any cease-and-desist order would help him toward it. (It can-
not be said that this individual's testimony did much to remove that
impression.)
On the other hand, new enterprise should not be discouraged from
starting up in areas where the prices of the dominant rivals offer the
widest margins over the costs of the local producers. By practicing
the kind of discrimination exemplified by the acts of General Foods
the dominant firm can preclude the existence of equally efficient smaller
firms who might indeed become more efficient and in the fullness of time
displace the large firm-by the simple expedient of cutting prices to
meet the competition.
In attempting, therefore, to find a solution on particular rather
than general grounds, and hence avoid, or evade, the central dilemma,
one might begin by asking whether General Foods was not liable under
the Sherman Act as presently interpreted, rather than the Robinson-
Patman Act. This possibility aside, it would seem that the anti-com-
petitive effects of General Foods' action much outweighed the com-
petitive ones. According to the document cited earlier, the small
western producer would have been able to expand and take over more
and more trade to the east, and would by 1942 have been offering
"some pretty tough competition in the middle West" where no com-
petition of any kind had existed before. As against this, the hearing
examiner and the Commission appeared impressed by the increase in
the absolute volume of sales by the smaller producer, but this is simply
a re-statement of the formula, which the Report rejects, that (non-)
injury to a competitor is (non-) injury to competition.4 Even if we
grant what actually seems doubtful, that the western producer should
have been deemed non-injured, surely the competitive process was
thwarted by General Foods' discrimination. Hence the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Mead, who would have found competitive
injury because of changes in the relative position of the respondent
and its rivals, seems like much better economics. In view of the
Clayton Act forbidding acts "where the tendency may be . ."
41. REXORT at 164.
42. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
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his opinion seems to the writer to be better law. This is of course
not to endorse the rest of his opinion, where he purported to prove
competitive injury by the opinion testimony of the respondent's com-
petitors. It is detestable to make a man a judge in his own case, and
it is nonsense to treat the unsupported opinion of an interested party
as though it were a verified fact. However, a good argument is not
refuted by a companion bad argument, and the unacceptable parts of
the dissenting opinion leave untouched the more convincing ones.
Arguments, like men, should not be condemned by their bad associa-
tions.
VI.
I have largely restricted this article to sections 2(a) and 2(b)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, in the belief that these key provisions
give us enough for an appraisal of the Report. In summary: the
Robinson-Patman Act as now interpreted accomplishes economic dis-
crimination against certain buyers because it does not permit the lower
costs of serving them to be taken into consideration. This thwarts
the competitive result and builds up pressure for avoidance or evasion.
Partial relief from the situation is accomplished if even a few sellers
are able to lower prices legally because others are then able to follow
suit. The restriction is great, and the exemption is very small-in fact,
it has never prevailed in any finally decided order.43  The sum and
substance of the Report is its suggestion that the restriction be relaxed
and the exemption kept at least as wide as it is now. Whether the
cost defense can be much widened remains to be seen, perhaps when
the report of the Advisory Committee on Cost Justification is com-
pleted and made public. Whether section 2(b) can assume any im-
portance in view of the heavy burden of proof it requires, the showing
of good faith on the part of the respondent, remains also to be seen.
44
Since the act both enables and compels businessmen to practice stable
and permanent discrimination, a monopolistic practice, its continuance
in any form will present vexing problems of reconcilement with the
Sherman Act.
This being the case, why not advocate the complete repeal of the
Robinson-Patman Act? Let us recall that no respectable findings of
fact were ever made that there was much discrimination in favor of
any buyers, over and above cost differentials; the widely held belief
that this was so is merely an important psychological and political
43. R PoRT at 205.
44. "Good faith" has nothing to do with anyone's state of mind or subjective
intent. It indicates an absence of collusive or predatory behavior.
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fact. The law itself has important anti-competitive consequences, and
what is, perhaps, more important than any economic aspect is the tone
and the atmosphere of its enforcement. If I were to characterize the
attitude of my colleagues toward the Sherman Act in one word, it
would be, "respect." One could not make the same statement about
the Robinson-Patman Act. It promotes discrimination and thwarts
competition while professing to do just the contrary. Edward H. Levi
has spoken of ". . . the disease of duplicity with which the Act is in-
fected." " This is harsh language for a law school dean to be using
about a statute, and it is widely echoed. Why not then be rid of it?
What stands in the way except a craven reluctance to advocate some-
thing politically impossible? If the Committee was going to report
not what its members believed, but what expediency dictated, why ap-
point any such Committee in the first place?
For better or worse, the writer was and is unwilling to go so far.
One reason may be shown in a comparison with the "fair trade" issue.
Here the question is whether permission to fix prices should be inserted
into an act against price fixing. "Fair trade" has no other meaning
or purpose but to raise prices by joint action above the competitive
level. Now, if it were true that the Robinson-Patman Act as currently
interpreted, disregarding some significant decisions of the last few
years, were the intent of Congress, then the only honest course would
be to say, as was said of "fair trade": Congress erred, and should undo
its error. But we have already seen that no intent of any kind can
logically be imputed to Congress. The statute must be taken to mean
what its language says. On its face, it makes it unlawful "to dis-
criminate in price" where the effect may be to lessen competition. We
saw earlier that discrimination in the economic sense might be undesir-
able in itself and indicative of monopoly power. There seems no rea-
son why "discriminate in price" can not be brought close to the economic
concept, and the legal interpretation brought close to the norms and
standards of the Sherman Act. At least, the attempt could be made.
If it is not successful, then the question of repeal will be in order.
45. Symposium, The Robinson-Patinan Act-Is It in the Public Interest?, ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 60, 67 (1952).
